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THE LESSON OF THE QUEBEC BRIDGE 
Wilfred G. Lockett[l] 
'Where no precedent exists the successful engineer is he who 
makes the fewest mistakes.'[21 
INTRODUCTION 
For most of history technological man has conceived, designed and 
built his pyramids, aqueducts, temples, cathedrals and bridges on 
the basis of divine inspiration, common sense and a considerable 
reliance on experience and precedent. The materials of 
construction have been generally those found in nature—stone, 
timber and vegetable fibre, supplemented by man-made bricks and 
mortar and fastenings of iron. Learning has been largely by trial 
and error and the transmission of accumulated knowledge has been 
through imitation and apprenticeship. Occasional texts have 
appeared, of which Vitruvius's De Architectura and Vlllard de 
Honnecourt's Sketchbook are notable examples. 
The completion in 1779 of a cast-iron bridge across the river 
Severn at Coalbrooke Dale in England heralded a new era. Cast 
iron soon gave way to wrought iron with its greater and more 
predictable tensile strength, and by the latter half of the 19th 
century the inventions of Bessemer and Siemens had made steel 
available in quantity to the construction industry, facilitating 
such engineering feats as the Brooklyn bridge in New York and the 
Forth bridge in Scotland. But progress was not confined to the 
introduction of a radically new building material. A parallel 
advancement took place in the methodology of engineering design. 
The adoption of a scientific approach gave rise to new technical 
subjects such as Strength and Elasticity of Materials and Theory 
of Structures. A quantitative notion of 'factor of safety' 
emerged. One might think that, with this new reliance on 
mathematical analysis, the element of 'trial and error' would 
lose prominence in engineering design. 
That such has not been the case is all too evident as recent 
events in the space and nuclear industries have shown. Indeed 
there have been so many 'cases' that to attempt an in-depth 
examination of how engineers learn from their mistakes would be a 
daunting task, not least because the value of the lesson learnt 
is not necessarily proportional to the magnitude of the error or 
the publicity it receives. But the study of one or two isolated 
1 7206 Cambridge Street, Niagara Falls, Ont. L2J 1G6 
2 Benjamin Baker, speaking in Montreal on the Forth Bridge, 
quoted in W. Westhofen, The Forth Bridge (London, 1890). 
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incidents might be expected to indicate areas for further 
investigation. 
Perhaps the most notorious failure in Canadian engineering 
history was the collapse during construction of the bridge over 
the St Lawrence near Quebec City (see Figure 1). In the calamity, 
which occurred on 29 August 1907, 74 of the 85 men working on the 
bridge at the time lost their lives. The Engineering Hevs 
commented 'The fall of this bridge ranks with the greatest 
engineering disasters in history.'[3] 
Within two days of the accident the Government of Canada had 
appointed a Commission of Inquiry. After six months of intensive 
investigation the Commission presented its report.[41 In the 
most forthright and uncompromising terms the Commission laid the 
blame firmly on the principal engineers involved, naming names, 
and effectively ruling out any question that an 'act of God' 
might have contributed to the accident. Nevertheless the story 
of the Quebec bridge is reminiscent of a Greek tragedy. Let us 
discover its moral. 
THE CANTILEVER PRINCIPLE 
The original Quebec bridge and the one which replaced it are 
both, like the Forth bridge in Scotland, cantilever bridges. 
Their outlines are shown on Figure 2. 
The fundamental elements of the cantilever structure are shown on 
Figure 3, and comprise essentially a bracket, jutting out from a 
tower which is prevented from overturning by a similar bracket 
firmly anchored to a solid foundation. A pair of these structures 
support between them the suspended span which completes the 
crossing of the river. We will later have to consider some of the 
basic engineering involved in the design of the structure, but in 
the meantime we should note that the upper members of the 
cantilever are in tension, while the lower members act as struts 
and are in compression. 
Cantilever bridges, by their very nature, lend themselves to 
being constructed outwards from the sides, without the neces-
sity of temporary falsework to support the central sections. 
HISTORY OF THE QUEBEC BRIDGE 
The idea of a crossing of the St Lawrence River in the 
neighbourhood of Quebec goes back to 1852 when General E.W. 
3 Engineering News, 5 September 1907. 
4 Royal Commission, Quebec Bridge Inquiry Report (Ottawa, 1908), 3 vols. This is the prime source for this article. 
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Serell, the engineer of the Lewlston and Queenston suspension 
bridge, acting for the City of Quebec, identified the present 
site. However, it was not until 1887 that the Quebec Bridge 
Company was formed to build and operate a combined rail and 
highway bridge. Further legislation followed in 1891, 1897 and 
1900 and in 1903 the name was changed to the Quebec Bridge and 
Railway Company (referred to hereafter as 'the Company'). 
In the meantime the Company had appointed as Chief Engineer 
Edward A. Hoare, who had some 35 years of experience in railway 
work in Canada, not, however, involving bridges with spans 
greater than about 300 feet. Hoare conducted surveys of the site 
during the 1890s, and recommended three possible locations from 
which was selected an alignment very close to the present one. 
In mid-1897 Hoare made contact at an engineering conference in 
Quebec with John S. Deans, Chief Engineer of the Phoenix Bridge 
Company of Phoenlxvllle, Pennsylvania, and subsequently sent him 
a profile of the crossing. The Phoenix Bridge Company took an 
enthusiastic Interest in the project and by the end of 1897 had 
sent a preliminary cantilever design to Hoare. In the meantime 
Deans had recommended to Hoare a well-reputed New York 
consultant, Theodore Cooper, who would be prepared to give the 
Company the benefit of his experience. 
During 1898 the Department of Railways and Canals approved the 
Company's preliminary plans—which were Identical with the 
Phoenix drafts—as a basis for calling tenders. The accompanying 
specifications, mainly copied from the those of the Department of 
Railways and Canals, were approved for tender purposes provided 
that more detailed specifications were drawn up for the actual 
construction of the bridge. 
Tenders were called and in March, 1899, bids were received for 
the following types of superstructure:[5] 
Bidder Type and Span of Bridge 
Cantilever Stiffened 
Suspension 
Dominion Bridge Co. 1600 ft 2000 ft 
Keystone Bridge Co. 1600 ft 
Phoenix Bridge Co. 1600 ft 1800 ft 
Union Bridge Co. 1800 ft 
Tenders were also received for the construction of the 
substructures. 
The Company engaged Theodore Cooper to examine and report on the 
tenders. In his report, dated 23 June 1899, he recommended 
5 See Cooper's 'Report on Tenders,' ibid., Ill, 439-40. 
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acceptance of the Phoenix bid for the cantilever bridge as being 'the "best and cheapest" plan and proposal submitted...*. Phoenix's tender price, adjusted by Cooper for purposes of fair comparison, was $2,439,000, to which Bust be added $1,144,000 for the substructures.[6] At the same time Cooper made two important recommendations: 
(a) that a program of subsurface exploration be undertaken to determine foundation conditions 
(b) that provision be made for modifying the specifications and design of the bridge, within reasonable limits, with a view to Improvement or economy 
The results of the site investigations were sent to Cooper in January, 1900, and in the following Hay he recommended to the company that the span of the bridge be increased from 1600 feet to 1800 feet. The relocation of the main piers away from the river's edge would, he claimed, result in a reduced risk of potentially costly problems during construction. Cooper also estimated that the cost of this change would amount to $200,000, provided that 'desirable and justifiable' modifications were made to the specifications.[7] 
The Company accepted Cooper's report in May 1900, and at the same time appointed him consulting engineer—initially for the examination of plans, but subsequently the scope of the engagement was enlarged to cover the whole period of the design and construction of the bridge. 
By the end of 1900 the Company had entered into contracts with W. Davis & Sons for the substructure works and with the Phoenix Bridge Company for the approach spans. Construction commenced at the site in October, 1900. Then there was a hiatus. And this gives us the opportunity to summarise events so far: 
(a) A company was founded to build and operate a major rail and highway bridge, which would be an important link in Canada's trans-continental communications system 
(b) The Company engaged as its Chief Engineer a person (Hoare) well experienced in general railway work but in no way a specialist in large bridges 
6 Inquiry Report, III, 444-5. 
7 Ibid., 446-7. 
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(c) All the preliminary designs of the bridge were 
prepared by a contractor (Phoenix Bridge Company) 
at its own expense, clearly in the hope that by so 
doing it would stand a good chance of being awarded 
the job in due course 
(d) Tenders were called on the basis of a preliminary 
design essentially the same as that of the Phoenix 
Bridge Company, and the standard specification of 
the Department of Railways and Canals 
(e) The Company retained as its Consulting Engineer a 
specialist in bridge design (Cooper), well-reputed 
in North America 
(f) In his report on the bids Cooper favoured the 
Phoenix Bridge Company 
(g) Following subsurface exploration Cooper recommended 
that the span of the bridge be increased from 1600 
to 1800 feet. This was accepted. 
(h) Contracts for the substructures and approach spans 
were awarded and work commenced at the site. 
The Involvement of a contractor to assist with preliminary 
designs in the very early stages of a project is noteworthy. In a 
comparison of six major bridges (Including the Forth bridge) the 
Royal Commission observed that 'all the bridges ...were designed 
by independent engineers except the Quebec bridge.'[8] The 
implications of not obtaining an independent design will be 
discussed later. 
It had been public knowledge from the start that the Company was 
seriously under-funded.[9] Attempts by Deans to Interest US 
bankers failed, and, not surprisingly, the Phoenix Bridge Company 
was reluctant to incur the high cost of the detailed design, let 
alone the fabrication, of the superstructure steelwork without 
some assurance it would be paid. Work on the main bridge was thus 
delayed and it was not until June, 1903, that an agreement was 
signed with the Phoenix Bridge Company, which incorporated the 
changed span of the bridge and a set of specifications amended by 
Cooper. Even then work was not started until October, 1903, when 
the government's Guarantee Act put the Company on a firm 
financial footing. 
The agreement of June, 1903, was a unit-price contract, as 
opposed to the 1899 lump-sum tender. The specified date for 
8 Ibid., I, 146. 
9 Ibid., 35. 
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completion was 31 December 1906, but in an attached letter D. 
Reeves, President of the Phoenix Bridge Company, refused to 
accept responsibility for damages due to delayed completion prior 
to 31 December 1908.[101 Clearly it was felt that three years, 
including three summer construction seasons, was a very short 
time for the design, fabrication of component members, shipping 
to site and erection of what would be a record-breaking 
cantilever bridge. 
The organization which evolved to carry out the design and 
construction of the bridge is illustrated in the diagram on 
Figure 4.[111. The Company's Chief Engineer, E.A. Hoare, was in 
principle the senior man on the whole project, responsible to the 
Company for final decision-making, at least in technical matters. 
But his lack of experience in major bridges led him to defer 
greatly to the Consulting Engineer, Cooper, who effectively 
assumed the reins of Chief Engineer. 
For the important function of detailed checking of the work in 
progress, the Company engaged three inspectors: N.R. McLure, E.L. 
Edwards (both selected by Cooper) and E.R. Kinloch. Edwards was 
inspector of shop work, assisted initially by McLure. After 
erection started HcLure moved to the site, where he and Kinloch 
were the only full-time representatives of the Company, Hoare 
being located in Quebec City, across the river some 10 miles 
away. It should be noted that McLure was a recent graduate (1904) 
while Kinloch was not a graduate engineer but had considerable 
experience in bridge construction from the practical standpoint. 
In the Phoenix Bridge Company, the detailed design of the bridge 
was the responsibility of P.L. Szlapka, Design Engineer, who 
reported to J.S. Deans, the Chief Engineer. A.B. Milliken was 
Superintendant of Erection and had the responsibility of 
appointing and generally supervising the field staff on all the 
firm's projects. He spent much time visiting the Quebec bridge 
site but while there acted in an advisory capacity so as not to 
undermine the authority of his senior site man, B.A. Yenser. 
Working under Yenser, who was classified as General Foreman, were 
two qualified engineers, A.H. Birks and F.A. Cudworth. 
The Organization Chart shows the formal procedure for approval of 
plans: Szlapka -> Cooper -> Szlapka -> Hoare -> Deputy Minister. 
In practice, as indicated in a table of dates at which various 
operations were performed,(12] when approved drawings were 
10 Ibid., 31. 
11 Adapted from ibid., 55. 
12 Ibid., 61. 
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received In Phoenlxvllle from Cooper, they were passed on to the 
shops for fabrication. 
We turn now to those design aspects which featured most 
prominently In the ultimate failure of the bridge. The three 
main categories of loading for which a bridge has to be designed 
are (1) the 'live load,' which includes the traffic the bridge is 
required to carry, as well as the wind load, (2) the 'dead load,' 
which is the self-weight of the bridge, and (3) special loading 
conditions which can occur during construction. 
The structure itself must have adequate strength to carry the 
combined effect of these loads safely. Tension members may be and 
often are made up of flat bars connected by steel 'pins.' Such an 
arrangement would not work in the case of compression members 
('columns' and 'struts') since the bars would have insufficient 
stiffness by themselves to resist buckling. Subsidiary bracing 
members ('latticing') must be provided to increase the stiffness 
or the struts must be made in such a form (e.g. cylindrical) as 
to be inherently resistant to buckling. 
Fundamentally, the design process involves the following steps: 
(a) The 'live loads': the intended traffic and the 
wind load are given in the specification 
(b) The maximum working stresses are also laid down in 
the specification 
(c) The designer estimates the self-weight of the 
structure (the 'dead load') from a previously-
conceived, approximate configuration 
(d) The total load is the combination of (a) and (c) 
(e) The 'scantlings' (essentially the cross-sections 
of the individual members) are determined by 
recognized methods of structural analysis, taking 
into account the total load (d) and the specified 
stress limits (b) 
(f) The self-weight is recalculated based on the 
scantlings arrived at in step (e), and compared 
with the assumed weight (c) 
(g) There follows a series of successive approximations in which the analysis is repeated, using the adjusted values of self-weight, until the values of (c) and (f) are equal 
We should note first that the working stresses specified by Cooper were somewhat higher than in normal usage. It is evident 
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from his testimony[13] that this decision vas taken after careful 
consideration and appeared, at the time, reasonable. It vas only 
in combination vith other factors that the higher stresses used 
as a basis for design became critical. 
Although the design procedure summarized above vas accepted 
practice at the time, the Phoenix Bridge Company failed to carry 
out steps (f) and (g), vith the following result:[141 
Weight Qt Half Bridge Lb. 
Weight assumed for design 31,364,800 
Actual veight 40,539,941 
Excess not designed for 29.3% 
The error vas not drawn to the attention of Cooper until 
February, 1906, by vhich time the anchor arm, tover and tvo 
panels of the cantilever arm had been fabricated, and six panels 
of the anchor arm had been erected at the site. In the Quebec 
bridge the shore side of the cantilever vas referred to as the 
'anchor arm,' the river side as the 'cantilever arm,' and the 
13 Ibid., II, 409-10. 
14 The derivation of these crucial figures is as follows 
(from the Inquiry Report, I, 57): 
Weights assumed for design lfe 
half suspended span 4,842,000 
cantilever arm 13,205,200 
anchor arm 13,307-600 
Total assumed for design 31,354,800 
corresponding total veigh recalculated 
from drawings 25 June 1907 38,816,000 
of this, steelvork veight 25,316.000 
[Thus veight of non-steel members 3,500,000] 
(from Report, I, 64): 
Actual veight of steelvork (revised 
from records, 25 September 1907) 37,039,941 
[Thus actual total veight 40,539,941] 
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central support as the 'tover;' each approximately 50-foot 
section of the bridge vas referred to as a 'panel.* Cooper 
estimated that the resulting increase in stress would be from 7 
to 10 per cent, and, feeling that there vas at this stage no 
remedy, permitted the vork to continue.[15] 
We have nov to consider the design of the compression members and 
in particular those of the lover chord, that part of the 
cantilever incorporating the distinct curve shovn in Figure 2(b). 
As noted above, the strength of a compression member or strut 
depends principally on its resistance to buckling. In the case of 
the Forth bridge this vas neatly accomplished by giving the 
members a cylindrical form, vhich during the erection stage 
Involved the building up of the member curved plate by curved 
plate, a procedure veil suited to the skills of Scottish 
shipwrights. But in North America the accepted practice vas to 
use standard rolled steel sections (angles, flats, I-beams, etc.) 
in the fabrication of structural members. In the Quebec bridge 
the struts vere built up from an array of parallel flat plates. 
Figure 5 shovs a comparison of the compression members of the 
Forth and Quebec bridges. The bracing introduced for stiffening 
the latter may be clearly seen. The active cross-sectional area 
vas about 800 square Inches in Forth bridge and 842 square inches 
in the Quebec bridge. 
The design of such members vas at the time a mixture of theory 
and practice vith empirical formulae playing an important part. 
In particular there vas no rigorous vay of determining the amount 
of latticing. These subjects vere addressed at length in Appendix 
16 of the QBI Report, vhich concluded: 
The foregoing discussion shovs that even at the present 
time theories of lattice design are in serious conflict 
and the strength of any lattice system vill vary 
materially according to the formula adopted. Mr. Szlapka 
used, vith his ovn modifications, the only system of 
lattice computation generally knovn to American 
engineers.... [He] selected the column formula adopted 
by his ovn company, and used the constants for it that, 
in his judgment, vere most in keeping vith the 
conditions of the case and in the best accord vith the 
spirit of the specification. He made vhat he considered a 
liberal increase in his adopted sections over vhat his 
computations called for. The result has shovn that his 
judgment vas faulty, but ve are not prepared at this date to 
define the minimum safe sections for the latticing of these chords.[16] 
15 Inquiry Report, I, 58. See also Cooper's testimony, 
ibid., II, 411. 
16 Ibid., I, 137. 
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It is often remarked that engineering disasters are rarely due to a single fault but are caused rather by a combination of more than one unfavorable condition. In the case of the Quebec bridge ve have the following concatenation of circumstances: 
The load on the structure vas significantly greater 
than that for vhich it vas designed 
This led to the stresses in the members being more 
than the specified vorking stresses, vhich vere 
already higher than normal 
Key members vere under-designed 
It should be mentioned here that inferiority of materials—often 
a contributing cause of structural failure—vas not a factor in 
the case of the Quebec bridge. The large quantity of steel 
required vas obtained from four mills: the Phoenix Iron Company 
(a subsidiary of the main contractor), the Central Iron and Steel 
Company, the Carnegie Steel Company and the Bethlehem Steel 
Company. Normal structural steel vas specified for the bridge, 
except in the case of the eyebars for the tension members, for 
vhich Cooper specified a slightly higher grade. In its 
investigations the Commission of Inquiry found that 'the disaster 
could not be traced to the furnaces or rolling mills.'[17] 
By August, 1907, construction had reached the stage vhere the 
south cantilever had been completed and erection of the suspended 
span, jutting out from the end of the cantilever, vas in hand. 
The 'big traveller,' a movable gantry used in the handling of 
components, vas being dismantled in anticipation of transferring 
it to the north bank, and a 'little traveller' vas in use for the 
vork on the suspended span (see Figure 6). 
During the month signs of distress vere observed in the lover 
chord members. The veb plates (i.e. the main load-carrying 
elements) of tvo members of the cantilever arm and one member 
(A9L) of the anchor arm vere bent, and measurements vere taken. 
On Tuesday, 27 August, the misalignment of A9L had increased from 
3/4 inch (measured the previous veek) to 2 1/4 inches. After 
discussions vith Birks, McLure and Kinloch, Yenser decided he 
vould not increase the load on the bridge, by moving the 
traveller out, until he received Instructions as to vhat remedial 
action should be taken. While there vas definite concern at this 
time regarding the problem of straightening the bent chords, it 
appears that none of the site staff thought the bridge vas in any 
immediate danger. Hovever, the attitude of the engineers on the 
project is vorth noting. Both Kinloch and Yenser considered the 
matter serious enough to varrant a special visit by HcLure and 
17 Ibid., 55-6. 
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Blrks to Cooper and Phoenixville for advice. This suggestion vas 
not welcomed by the two engineers who felt they would be 
ridiculed. In particular Birks felt that the bend must have 
occurred prior to construction and was not due to the gradually 
increasing erection load. 
[Birks] knew better than anyone else on the work the 
care with which the calculations and designs had been 
made, he was familiar with the experience and abilities 
of the designers, and could calculate that the stresses 
were then far below the expected maximum. To engineers 
the force of such reasoning is very great, and we do not 
consider that the confidence Mr. Blrks placed in his 
superiors was in any way unusual or unreasonable. There 
was no misunderstanding, however, on his part; he 
realized that if the bends had not been in the chord 
before it was erected the bridge was doomed, and 
although Mr. McLure had I evidence that the bends had 
increased more than one inch in the course of a week, 
although Mr. Kinloch was positive that the bends had 
very recently greatly increased, and although Mr. Clark 
[storage yard foreman] stubbornly maintained that the 
chord was absolutely straight when it left [the] yard, 
Mr. Birks still strove to convince himself that they 
must have been mistaken.[18] 
Hoare visited the site on Wednesday, 28 August, and 'appeared 
very anxious that [Kinloch] should abandon [his] position that 
the bend had occurred since the erection of the cantilever arm.' 
Nevertheless he authorised McLure to visit Cooper and wire back 
if the latter took a serious view of the situation. 
On the same day, 26 August, Yenser, rather than have an idle 
workforce on his hands, changed his mind and decided to continue 
with erection. McLure objected that he thought this was 'poor 
policy,' but Hoare confirmed the decision 'as the moral effect of 
holding up the work would be very bad on all concerned...'[19] 
McLure proceeded to New York, arriving there on the morning of 29 
August. Cooper, who had just received by mail McLure's sketches 
showing the bends in chord A9L, decided that no further weight 
should be added to the bridge. But he was concerned as to whether 
the contractor's general foreman (Yenser) would take his direct 
order to stop work and wired the Phoenix Bridge Company 'to add 
no more load to the bridge until after due consideration of the 
facts.' This was felt to be the surest way of communicating with 
the site, since the Bridge company had a direct telephone line. 
18 Ibid., 87. 
19 Hoare to Cooper, 28 August, ibid., I, 88. 
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Cooper instructed McLure to discuss the problem vith Deans. McLure's arrival in Phoenixville, at about 5.00 pm on Thursday, 29 August, coincided vith the collapse into a tangled heap of the whole superstructure, taking the lives of 74 men, including Yenser and Birks. (Figures 7) 
THE ROYAL COMMISSION 
The Canadian Government lost no time in reacting to the disaster. 
By Order of Council dated 31 August 1907, a Commission of Inquiry 
was appointed comprising the following members: 
Henry Holgate (Chairman), a partner in the firm of Ross 
and Holgate, with considerable experience in railway 
and electrical engineering, and as an arbitrator 
John Galbraith, President of the Canadian Society of 
Civil Engineers, and for 30 years Professor of 
Engineering at the University of Toronto 
John G.G. Kerry, a partner in the firm of Smith, Kerry 
and Chase, and (part-time) Associate Professor at 
McGill College 
It was generally felt that these three eminent engineers 
constituted a broad and well-balanced commission, well qualified 
to carry out the detailed investigation so obviously required. To 
provide an independent opinion of the design of the bridge the 
Department of Railways and Canals appointed C.C. Schneider, 
Consulting Engineer of Philadelphia, whose report is attached to 
that of the Commission.[20] 
The investigation lasted for six months, and included the 
intensive questioning of some 44 witnesses. As might be expected 
the examination was particularly relentless of the key figures in 
the drama: Hoare, Cooper, Deans, Szlapka, McLure and Kinloch. But 
there is no indication of reluctance on the part of the 
witnesses. On the contrary, considering how many of them must 
have been feeling, their apparent willingness to cooperate to the 
full is noteworthy. 
It is not the intention here to rehearse in any detail the 
progress of the Commission's comprehensive investigations. 
However, an examination of the behaviour of compression members 
was carried out, the results of which, having to do with the mode 
of failure of the bridge, are particularly relevant. 
The Phoenix Bridge Company possessed the largest compression 
testing machine in existence. After the collapse of the bridge 
the Bridge Company, at its own cost and on its own initiative, 
20 Ibid., 152-206. 
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built and tested a model of the A9 chords, scaled dovn to 1/3 
full size to bring It within the capacity of the machine. 
Subsequently other models vere made and tested at the request of 
the Commission. The tests clearly demonstrated hov, for the 
load-bearing vebs to buckle, the latticing mustfall first. 
(Figure 8) 
Appendix 16 of the Commission's Report, vhlch Is devoted to a 
discussion of the theory of built-up compression members, takes 
Into account the results of these tests. Its comments Included 
the remarks quoted above. 
The somevhat Indecisive conclusion reached by the Commission In 
the matter of compression member design did not deter them from 
pointing an unvaverlng finger at Szlapka and Cooper as being 
primarily responsible for the shortcomings in the design of the 
bridge as a vhole. At the same time the Company vas criticized 
for its selection of Hoare as its Chief Engineer and for the very 
veak field organization, vhlch lacked anyone having the 
experience to identify a critical situation vhen it arose 
combined vith the authority to call a halt to construction vhen 
lives vere in danger. 
The Commission's report, vith 19 Appendices, comprises three 
volumes including a folio of 37 drawings. The report itself 
consists of 5-page letter in volume 1 and is a masterpiece of 
economy. 
THE REACTION OF THE TECHNICAL PRESS 
Nevs of the collapse of the Quebec bridge vas received by the 
technical press vith the sympathy one would expect, not only for 
the victims, but also for the engineers vho vere involved. There 
vas a clear recognition that a detailed investigation vas needed 
to identify the cause of the disaster and particularly to 
determine vhat lessons might be learned from it. 
The reporting by the Engineering News (the predecessor of the 
current Engineering Nevs-Record vas outstanding. Within days they 
had a team at the site and vere publishing detailed accounts, 
illustrated vith several photographs, of the events before and 
after the collapse. The progress of the Commission's 
investigation vas regularly reported on. But the important 
contribution of the technical press came after the issue of the 
Commission's Report in February, 1908. The British journal 
Engineering contained some critical editorial comment: 
The moral of the disaster is that very Important changes 
are necessary in American methods of bridge-building 
vhen applied to structures of exceptional size. The 
evidence shovs that there has unquestionably been in the 
32 
Figure 7(a) Wreckage, looking south [top]; 7(b) looking north 
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Figure 8: Test of «odel chord 
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past too great a gulf between the drawing office and 
shops of American bridge-works. 
and again: 
Another characteristic of the ultra school of American 
bridge design is the reliance placed on formulae, which 
appear to be used as a substitute for judgment rather 
than as an aid to it.[21] 
The Canadian Engineer of 13 March 1908 included a summary of the 
Commission's Report with little comment, but saw fit to print in 
a later issue a letter from a certain A.6. Midford, which 
concluded with chauvinistic fervour: 
The Yankee has had his opportunity and failed. Now that the 
Quebec Bridge is to be nationalized and—Including its 
failure—paid for by Canadians, it is high time that 
Canadian engineers should design and erect it, for with them 
the habit of dropping into the river half erected or 
completed bridges has not become chronic.[22] 
But, once again, it was the The Engineering Neva which published 
in its issue of 19 March, the most comprehensive account of the 
Commission's report. And its editorial in the same issue, 
endorsing and at the same time going beyond the Commission's 
conclusions, should be required reading for all latter-day 
technocrats. The following brief extracts present the American 
version of the transatlantic criticism quoted above: 
And the lesson is the contrast between the practical man 
—the man whose only training was the training of the 
shop and the field—and the engineer with a thorough 
technical education. 
When the inspectors of the bridge found a bottom-chord 
member bent—not merely kinked but bent alike in every 
component part and on its entire length—who was it that 
perceived the seriousness of the situation? Not the 
scientifically-trained engineering directors of the 
work. Birks laughed down all fears. He set his belief 
that the chord could not be crippling because, forsooth, 
it was not yet loaded to anything like what it was 
designed to carry... 
Kinloch, the bridge inspector, a 'practical' man, saw more clearly than any other man the fast coming 
21 Engineering, 27 March 1908. 
22 The Canadian Engineer, 24 April 1908. 
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disaster, and he made a two-days fight to bring all the 
others to see the danger. 
McLure also, vho had the advantage of a college 
training, sav the danger, but, as the man of least 
experience among those on the ground, he appears to have 
been least ready to assert his vievs strongly.[23] 
The editorial vent on to assert that it vas of course in favour 
of college training for engineers, but stressed that such 
graduates had an obligation to be 'even more practical than the 
vorkman,' there being lessons to be learned on the shop floor 
vhich cannot be taught in the classroom. 
It is of course true that things like this have been 
said many times before; but the trouble is, ve have not 
taken them to heart. We have supposed that they referred 
to the men vho try to do professional vork vith nothing 
but theoretical knowledge. It has not occurred to us 
that the men in the top ranks of the profession, vho 
have been building great engineering vorks for nearly a 
lifetime, needed such admonitions. And yet that is vhat the 
event shovs. We all of us, juniors and seniors alike, need 
to knov more, -to test our theories constantly in the light 
of nev knowledge vhen it comes, veil attested, from any 
source. Yes, surely, the great lesson from this greatest 
disaster is the lesson of humility.[24] 
CONSEQUENCE: THE SECOND BRIDGE 
Before commenting on the disaster Itself and the manner in vhich 
it vas treated on the technical press, let us look briefly at 
vhat vas done in the case of the second Quebec bridge shovn in 
outline on Figure 2(c). 
The successful completion of this bridge in 1917 must be credited 
primarily to the fresh administrative approach, vhich is in sharp 
contrast to the veak organization vhich managed the first bridge. 
The 'owner,1 vhich vas effectively the Government of Canada, 
appointed a poverful Board of Engineers, including, until his 
death in 1916, the consultant C.C. Schneider, vhich in turn vas 
supported by a substantial staff of engineers, draftsmen, 
calculators, as veil as shop, field and mill Inspectors. Prior to 
going to tender the Board's engineers carried out extensive 
preliminary studies, and followed these vith the detailed design 
of a cantilever bridge. The bidders vere asked to tender on this 
23 Engineering Nevs, 19 March 1908. 
24 Ibid. 
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plus four modifications, and the final design is that of the 
successful bidder, the St Lawrence Bridge Company Limited. 
Details of the bridge are given in a 'completion report' prepared 
by the Board of Engineers.[25] It will be seen from Figure 2(c) 
that the cantilever structure still has a span of 1800 feet. The 
framing also has the same 'K-truss' configuration as the old 
bridge. But the specifications for the new bridge called for 
greater live loads and lower working stresses. These factors, 
combined with a greater degree of conservatism in the detailed 
design of the structure, resulted in a much heavier bridge, as 
the following comparison with the old bridge shows: 
Second Bridge First Bridge 
Total weight (tons) 66,480 40,500 
Lower chord member 
Height 7'-3 3/8" 4'-6 1/2" 
Width 10'-3 1/4" 5'-7 1/2" 
Area of steel (sq. in.) 1,941 842 
The new bridge differed from its predecessor in one other 
important feature: the method of erecting the central suspended 
span. It will be recollected that in the first bridge this was 
built outwards as a temporary extension of the cantilever, with 
the intention of freeing the support when the connection was 
finally made with the northern half of the bridge. In the case of 
the new bridge both sides were built out only to the ends of the 
cantilevers. The central span was completed separately and 
floated out to the site on pontoons, from which it was hoisted 
into position between the cantilevers. The first attempt, on 11 
September 1916, ended in failure when a component of the hoisting 
tackle fractured and the suspended span fell into the river (pace 
Midford), unfortunately with some loss of life. But this accident 
in no way reflected on the design of the bridge or the basic 
method of construction. 
COMMENTS 
After a span of eighty years is there anything more that can be 
said of the Quebec bridge experience? In view of Benjamin 
Baker's comment quoted at the head of this article, we should ask 
if the first Quebec bridge was precedent-setting. At first glance 
the answer must be 'no,' for the Forth bridge itself, designed by 
John Fowler and Benjamin Baker, was the first bridge to employ 
the cantilever principle on such an large scale, and remains to 
this day, with its three cantilevers having centre-to-centre 
25 Government Board of Engineers, The Quebec Bridge over the 
St Lawrence (Ottawa, 1918). 
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spans over 100 feet longer than the Quebec bridge, a much more 
impressive structure.[26] But there are important differences, 
as remarked by Professor C E . Inglis in an address to the 
Institution of Civil Engineers in 1944: 
The [Forth] bridge was a hand-made production, being built 
up plate by plate even as a ship is constructed. Cheap and 
abundant labour could be obtained from the neighbouring 
Clyde shipyards, and consequently it was possible and 
legitimate to indulge in refinements of design which 
nowadays would have to be ruled out because of their 
prohibitive cost... 
In [the] first Quebec bridge money was very tight and to 
keep costs within certain prescribed limits the designer 
adopted the hazardous expedient of putting his working 
stresses up to a limit well beyond all previous practice... 
The Quebec bridge, like all modern bridges, was machine 
made. To reduce labour costs the work of erection was 
cut down to the minimum. The various members were 
brought to the site as far as possible in a completed 
form, and the design was dominated by two main consider-
ations: ease of erection and the transportation of 
ready-made parts.[27] 
While the last paragraph of Inglis1s comments referred to the 
second Quebec bridge, it could equally be applied to the first. 
In the all-important matter of the compression members we have 
noted (with Inglis) that the tubular struts of the Forth bridge 
were tailor-made plate by plate. There was at least one precedent 
for this: the massive elliptical tubes which formed the arch 
elements in I.K. Brunei's Tamar bridge (opened 1859). It would 
probably be fair to say that the prefabricated struts of the 
Quebec bridge involved a far greater departure from previous 
experience than in the British case. The minimum dimensional 
tolerances which could be achieved in practice left room for 
26 The eye of the observer is drawn to the centre-to-centre 
spacing of the cantilevers. In the case of the Quebec bridge, 
where the central towers comprise single trestle frames, this 
dimension is also the clear span, which the Quebec bridge can 
rightly claim to be the world's longest for the type of 
structure. The towers of the Forth bridge comprise two trestles, 
and the eye observes more readily the centre-to-centre spacing of 
1912.5 feet than the clear span of 1700 feet (see figures 2). 
27 C.E. Inglis, 'The Aesthetic Aspect of Civil Engineering 
Design,' in The Institution of Civil Engineers, The Aesthetic 
Aspect of Civil Engineering Design—A Record of Six Lectures 
Delivered at the Institution (London, 1945), 59-61. 
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misfits in the field assembly that could lead to eccentricity of loading.[28] In the face of the imperfect methods available for designing the latticing, the need for conservatism should have been self-evident. 
The most conspicuous error in design was, in my view, the 
omission of the iterative process which equated the design dead 
load to the weight of the structure. The result of this neglect 
meant that the bridge was virtually doomed to failure before a 
single piece of steel had been erected. As the load on the bridge 
increased during construction, the growing stresses would 
inevitably seek out the weakest elements of the bridge's fabric, 
and it would only have been by the providential absence of any 
unfavourable circumstances of an secondary nature that a very 
weak bridge might have been completed. And then all traffic would 
have been at risk. If, conversely, the bridge had been designed 
for its actual dead weight, it is conceivable that the other 
shortcomings would not have caused failure, but, again, a less 
than ideal structure would have resulted. 
The explanation for this appalling error would seem to be that, 
once the Phoenix Bridge Company resumed active work on the 
superstructure contract following the 1900-1903 hiatus, 
insufficient time and money were budgetted for Szlapka's 
department to carry out a critical review of the preliminary 
studies and complete a thorough working design. When he 
discovered the omission early in 1906 Szlapka must have realized 
its implications. Clearly he decided to 'pass the buck' to 
Cooper. Neither had the courage to 'blow the whistle.' 
In the event, the weaknesses manifested themselves in the field 
during August, 1907, and the failure on the part of the site 
staff and Hoare to foresee the perilous consequences of the 
increasing distortions in member A9L was responsible for the loss 
of life when the bridge inevitably collapsed. 
The technical press made much of the comparison between the 
'practical1 man and the college-trained professional. This 
oft-repeated argument must surely have arisen when, during the 
nineteenth century, an increasing number of graduates from 
technical schools entered the profession and started applying 
analytical methods in engineering design. It is unfortunate that 
an impression is sometimes given of a mistrust of calculation in 
favour of 'judgement.' Nevertheless judgement is often called 
for, never more obviously than in August, 1907. The point is not 
that the 'practical man' (Kinloch) was right and the 
college-trained engineers (Birk and McLure) were wrong, but that 
28 Eccentricity of loading could, in turn, lead to 
distortions such as were observed in chord member A9L. 
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the latter failed to apply their technical knowledge in response 
to Klnloch's concerns. 
We have already noted one aspect of the first Quebec bridge which 
was unusual, namely that all stages of the design were carried 
out by the contractor. No separate charges were made for this 
service, the cost of which would be absorbed in the billing rates 
for the manufacture and construction of the bridge itself. Once 
these rates were fixed, any cost saved by cutting corners in the 
design would be reflected in an increase of the contractor's 
profit. 
The more normal practice was, and remains, that the early design 
studies, as well as the basic final design, including the general 
sizing of the members and preparation of technical 
specifications, are carried out by a staff of engineers working 
directly for the client. Whether this staff is directly employed 
or a firm of consulting engineers is engaged, the important fact 
is that the sezvice is paid for. The contractor may or may not be 
invited to submit alternative designs at the tendering stage. 
Certainly it is quite common for the contractor to prepare detail 
drawings, subject to the approval of the client's engineers, of 
such elements as the joints between members, and he will always 
prepare his own shop drawings for the manufacture and fabrication 
stages. Again, during the construction phase the client will 
engage a competent supervisory staff to oversee the work of the 
contractor in the field. A similar procedure was followed and 
played an important role in the case of the second Quebec bridge. 
But we must repeat that this procedure for the execution of a 
major public works project was already established practice when 
the Quebec bridge was first promoted. The initial blame for the 
1907 disaster must rest with the Quebec Bridge Company for 
failing to recognize that there is no such thing as free 
engineering. 
Whether this lesson has yet been learned is debatable. 
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